A. 23

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Page 1
             HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL - R. RICCI
2
            UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
            SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
    ----X
    In Re:
6
                               Chapter 11
7
    LEHMAN BROTHERS Case No. 08-13555 (JMP)
    HOLDINGS, INC., et al., (Jointly Administered)
9
                   Debtors.
10
11
12
            * * *HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL* * *
13
               DEPOSITION OF RICH RICCI
14
                 New York, New York
15
                  September 8, 2009
16
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18
19
20
21
22
23
    Reported by:
24
    KATHY S. KLEPFER, RMR, RPR, CRR, CLR
25
    JOB NO. 24547
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	Page 2	2	Page
1	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL - R. RICCI	1	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL - R. RICCI
2	September 8, 2009	2	APPEARANCES:
3	9:56 a.m.	3	JONES DAY, LLP
4	7.50 a.m.	4	Attorneys for Lehman Brothers, Inc.
5	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL deposition	5	222 East 41st Street
6	of RICH RICCI, held at Jones Day,	6	New York, New York 10017-6702
7	LLP, 222 East 41st Street, New York,	7	BY: DAVID L. CARDEN, ESQ.
		8	JENNIFER DEL MEDICO, ESQ.
8	New York, before Kathy S. Klepfer,	9	BART GREEN, ESQ.
9	a Registered Professional Reporter,	10	Billi Gidbi i, ab Qi
0	Registered Merit Reporter, Certified	11	BOIES, SCHILLER & FLEXNER, LLP
1	Realtime Reporter, Certified Livenote	12	Attorneys for Barclays and the Witness
2	Reporter, and Notary Public of the	13	5301 Wisconsin Avenue, NW
3	State of New York.	14	Washington, DC 20015
4			
5		15	BY: HAMISH HUME, ESQ.
6		16	JONATHAN D. SCHILLER, ESQ.
7		17	LOUIS SMITH, ESQ.
8		18	THE COURT OF THE C
9		19	QUINN, EMANUEL, URQUHART, OLIVER & HEDGES, LI
0		20	Attorneys for the Creditors Committee
1		21	51 Madison Avenue
2		22	22nd Floor
3		23	New York, New York 10010
4		24	BY: ERIC M. KAY, ESQ.
25		25	
	Page ·	4	Page
1	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL - R. RICCI	1	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL - R. RICCI
2	APPEARANCES: (Cont'd.)	2	
3	JENNER & BLOCK, LLC	3	
4	Attorneys for the Examiner	4	
5	330 N. Wabash Avenue	5	
6	Chicago, Illinois 60611-7603	6	
7	BY: DAVID C. LAYDEN, ESQ.	7	
8	,	8	
9	HUGHES, HUBBARD & REED, LLP	9	
0	Attorneys for the SIPA Trustee	10	
1	One Battery Park Plaza	11	
2	New York, New York 10004-1482	12	DENACTEN
3	BY: WILLIAM R. MAGUIRE, ESQ.	13	REDACTED
4	KENNETH E. LEE, ESQ.	14	
5	FARA TABATABAI, ESQ.	15	
_	THE HEATTEN HOX.	16	
6		17	
6 7		18	
6 7 8			
6 7 8	Also Present	à	
6 7 8 9	Also Present:	19	
6 7 8 9 0	Also Present: RAJESH ANKALKOTI, Alvarez & Marsal	19 20	
6 7 8 9 0		19 20 21	
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			Proposition (Control of Control o
	Page 10		Page 11
1		1	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL - R. RICCI
2		2	were involved in the discussions on behalf of
3		3	Barclays?
4		4	A. We did.
5		5	Q. Who were they?
6		6	A. It would have been Bob Diamond, Jerry
7	REDACTED	7	del Missier. The team was built up over time.
8	NEVAVIEV	8	So Mike Keegan, Stephen King, Michael Evans,
9		9	Archie Cox, Michael Klein, who we retained as an
10		10	advisor on the transaction. Certainly we had
11		11	conversations with our board and John Varley.
12		12	I'm sure there were others.
13		1.3	
14		14	
15		15	
16		16	
17	Q. What was your role in connection with	17	
18	those conversations or that possible transaction	18	REDACTED
19	with Lehman Brothers?	19	KEVACIEV
20	A. My role at the time was as one of the	20	
21		21	
22		22	
23	teed up as the, I guess as the senior person to	23	
24		24	
25		25	
***************************************	Page 12		Page 13
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1		4	REDACTED
4 5		5	VENACIEN
6		6	
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9		9	
10		10	Q. And we know at some juncture the
11		11	conversations related to the acquisition of all
12	REDACTED	12	of Lehman Brothers ended on Sunday. Can you
13	VENWIEN	13	tell me why, sir?
14		14	A. We had reached an agreement we felt
15		15	with Lehman Brothers that was always subject to
16		16	certain regulatory conditions. On Sunday, the
17		17	14th, there was a question as to the ability of
18		18	Lehman to open on Monday morning and that there
19		19	would be required for Lehman to open a guarantee
20		20	of all Lehman's liabilities.
21		21	Under UK listing rules, a guarantee of
22		22	that size cannot happen without shareholder
23		23	approval. We asked the UK listing authority to
24		24	waive that ruling. They did not. We then asked
		25	the United States Government to provide that
25		<i>v</i> . つ	me cinned states crovernment to brovide that

	Page 14		Page 15
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1 2	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL - R. RICCI	1	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL - R. RICCI
3	guarantee, and they said they could not do that.	2	concerning the acquisition of the entire firm?  A. There were several dialogues.
4		3 4	<ul><li>A. There were several dialogues.</li><li>Q. Okay. Tell me what they were, if you</li></ul>
5		5	will.
6		6	A. So Bob Diamond would have had a
7		7	conversation with Dick Fuld initially; I had a
8		8	brief conversation, series of conversations with
9		9	Mark Shafir; and Michael Klein and Archie Cox
10	****	10	would have a series of conversations with Mark
11	56 B 8 8 7 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1	11	Shafir and others.
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18		18	REDACTED
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25	it happened, and having the discussion	25	
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1		1	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL - R. RICCI
2		2	Q. Was the team essentially the same team
3		3	that you had before when you were evaluating the
4	Wi. 700 No. 80 at 100 Sept 100	4	purchase of the entire firm?
5	REDACTED	5	A. Yes.
6	to to compare the service of the control con-	6	
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12	REDACTED	12	REDACTED
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2		2	ARRA MICO CORA. del JOSO JARRA SIAN ESPA.
3		3	REDACTED
4		4	7 W WWW WAY - W WA 70 WWW WY
5		5	
6		6	Q. We were talking about you having gone
7		7	over to Lehman Brothers on the Monday, and we
8		8	got into the conversation concerning the
9		9	instructions given as to the assets that
10		10	Barclays was going to be acquiring.
11		11	Did you have any conversations with
12		12	anyone at Lehman while you were over at the
13	#1.00 W #7.7 W # 86 W	13	Lehman offices that day?
14		14	A. Regarding?
15		15	Q. Anything.
16		16	A. I recall I think speaking to some of
17		17	the human resource people on the Monday about
18		18	potential people issues.
19		19	Q. What do you mean by "people issues"?
20		20	A. It was, with all the uncertainty
21 22		21	around Lehman and in the market, it was
23 23		22	Lehman people were being very, very heavily
24	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	23 24	recruited by other Wall Street firms, and I was
25 25		24 25	concerned that Lehman may lose a lot of its core
<u> </u>		23	people.
	Page 36		Page 37
1	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL - R. RICCI	1	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL - R. RICCI
2	Q. At some time on the Monday, was there	2	among those that would be, if the transaction
3	a conversation with anyone in which you were	3	went through, moving to Barclays?
4	involved let me rephrase that. At any time	4	A. Lehman presented me and others with a
5	did you have a conversation on Monday, September	5	number of roughly \$2 billion that they felt they
6	15, about the need to establish a bonus pool for	6	needed to compensate the Lehman staff.
7	Lehman people to keep them from leaving the	7	Q. Did you agree to that number?
8	employment of Lehman and then Barclays?  A. I don't recall if that was	8	A. Not initially. It was presented to
9 10	A. I don't recall it that was specifically on Monday, the 15th.	9	me.  O Did there come a time when you did
11	Q. At some point did you have such a	10 11	Q. Did there come a time when you did agree to that number?
12	conversation?	12	A. Yes.
13	A. Yes.	13	Q. When was that?
14	Q. With whom did you have that	14	A. Sometime during that week.
15	conversation or conversations?	15	Q. Do you recall when?
16	A. I had conversation with Skip McGee and	16	A. No.
17		17	Q. When you say that you agreed to the
18	1 1	18	number, does that mean that Barclays committed
19		19	to pay the \$2 billion in bonuses to the
20		20	individuals at Lehman who would be coming into
21	;	21	Barclays' employment?
22		22	MR. HUME: Objection.
23		23	Mischaracterizes the testimony.
24		24	A. What we had agreed was that we would
25	` '	25	assume a liability related to compensation.

	Page 38		Page 39
1	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL - R. RICCI	1	Lage 33
2	"Compensation" was defined in my conversations	2	
3	as bonuses or severance or other non- sort of	3	
4	salary-related matters, that we would assume	4	
5	that liability, but we didn't agree that we	5	
6	would pay the whole thing out.	6	
7	We recognized we might have to, but we	7	
8	did not agree that we would absolutely pay the	8	DEDACTED
9	whole thing out. In the end, we did, but at the	9	REDACTED
10	time, we didn't absolutely agree. We were	10	
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19	VENACIEN	19	Q. You say there was scenarios under
20		20	which you might not have to pay that amount.
21		21	What did you mean by that?
22		22	A. It was a, you know, I didn't know a
23		23	scenario might have where, if we had kept fewer
24		24	people than we thought, there were also
25		25	scenarios we may have had to pay more if we
	Page 40		Page 41
1	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL - R. RICCI	1	
2	ended up keeping more Lehman people than we	2	
3	thought. So that's an example.	3	
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8 9	8	O Ag of the time that this was accounted
10	9 10	Q. As of the time that this was executed, sir.
11	1	MR. HUME: Objection. Lacks
REDACTED	12	foundation as to what that date is.
10	- I 3	A. I can't speak for every single asset,
14	4 5	but in order to try to answer your question, if
15 16	## 5 #1 6	there given what I know about the timing of when we first started looking at their assets
17	17	versus when this agreement was signed, I would
18	18	think there would have been a discount, yes, of
19	<b>1</b> 9	Lehman assets the Lehman marks on their
20	20	assets, yes.
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## 08-13555-mg Doc 5521-11 Filed 10/15/09 Entered 10/15/09 17:26:11 Appendix Volume II - A. 23 Pg 14 of 27

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	Pa	ıge 52		Page 53
1			1	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL - R. RICCI
2			2	previously marked as Exhibit 285B.
3			3	A. Thank you.
4			4	Q. Which has two e-mails on it, the top
5			5 6	one from you to Mr. Clackson and the bottom from Mr. Clackson to you and Mr. Evans. Take a
7			7	moment and review it.
8			8	(Document review.)
9			9	A. Okay.
10 11	REDACTED		10 11	Q. Okay. The first e-mail let's just start with the bottom because it's an e-mail
12	11 lbs lb f d "1 No 1 No 10"		12	chain. Mr. Clackson writes to you and Mr. Evans
13			13	on Wednesday, September 17th, at 7:07 P.M.
14			14	regarding a \$650 million problem. Do you recall
15 16		1	15 16	having gotten this e-mail, sir?  A. Yes.
1 7			то 17	А. 155.
18			18	
19			19	NOS. 200 Std. N. American Std. Std.
20			20	REDACTED
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25 Q.	I'm going to show you what has been		25	

PAGES 54-117 REDACTED

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	Page 120	Page 121
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2	2	are and an area of the same to
3	3	REDACTED
4 5	5	
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7	7	
8	8	Q. We're going to come to this in the
9	9	afternoon after you've been fed, but at towards the end of the week there was an effort to
10 11	10 11	identify additional Lehman assets for purposes
12 REDACTED	12	of the transaction, correct?
13	13	A. That is correct, to replace assets
14	*** <u>4</u>	that weren't delivered earlier in the week and
15	5	agreed to earlier in the week.
16 17	16 17	Q. Right. Were you involved in evaluating strike that. Were you involved in
18	# / # 8	that process at any level?
19	19	A. I was involved in at a high level
20	20	in terms of the potential assets.
21	21	Q. Did you give anyone working for you
22	22	or, for that matter, anybody at Lehman Brothers
23	23	a number which they should try to identify
K4	1	
3 4 5	24 25	

	Page 122		Page 123
1	-	1	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL - R. RICCI
1 2	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL - R. RICCI of adding in the transaction?	2	number other than trying to replace replacement
3	A. I don't recall being given the	3	value what we couldn't get our hands on. I
l .		4	don't recall what that number was off the top of
4	specific number.	5	=
5	Q. The confusion can simply be mine, but	1	my head.
6	at some point you stopped look for assets,	6	
7	right?	7	
8	A. Yes.	8	
9	Q. Okay. Why did you stop when you	9	
10	FF	10	
11	1	11	
12	certainly understand your question.	12	
13	You know, we had an agreement earlier	13	REDACTED
14		14	VENWAIPA
15	whole week about trying to find assets that were	15	
16	r r ,	16	
17	that we had agreed to, they had been seized by	17	
18	<b>F</b> , — ,	18	
19	were trying to replace those with assets of	19	
20	similar value as best we could.	20	
21	Q. I was simply just trying to identify	21	
22	whether there was a number in terms of the	22	
23	valuation of those additional assets that you	23	
24	were trying to identify.	24	
25	A. No, I don't think we had a specific	25	
	Page 124	***************************************	Page 125
1		1	REDACTED
2		2	!\ <b>\\</b> \''\\\!\\
3		3	
4		4	Q. How did you intend for Barclays to
5		5	have the cushion you described it needed to be
6		6	accomplished in the purchase of those assets?
7		7	A. There were several ways to achieve it,
8		8	we had hoped. One was to ensure that in any
9		9	price we were paying for assets, particularly
10		10	illiquid prices, illiquid assets, of which there
11		11	were a lot, that we had an appropriate liquidity
12	REDACTED	12	premium in our price.
13	WENWFIFM	13	Secondly, as I've already testified,
14		14	on the comp and the cure payments, we had hoped
15		15	that we could pay less than what we had assumed
16		16	but recognize that we might have to assume
<b>₽</b> 7		17	those. And also, we had intangible assets, that
18		18	is, you know, accounting function that might
19		19	help create some cushion. Those were the big
20		20	components.
21		21	
22		22	REDACTED
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1		1	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL - R. RICCI	
2	nrn <i>1/</i> Trn	2	right now.	
3 4	REDACTED	3	<ul><li>A. Reports to Mr. Lucas.</li><li>Q. Was Mr. Lucas with you in New York</li></ul>	
5		5	during the negotiations?	1
6		6	A. No.	ĺ
7		7	Q. Did you communicate to Mr. Lucas	
8	Q. Let's just go back to Exhibit 378 for	8	during the week of September 15th concerning	ľ
9	just a moment, which is in front of you. And	9	the transaction, apart from what might be an	١
10	you were on the board call. Do you have any	10	e-mail?	۱
11	recollection while being on the call of anyone	11	A. I can't recall, but I must have.	
12	saying that Barclays was acquiring \$75 billion	12	Q. Can you tell me who in your view would	
13	worth of assets?	13	have been the one who would have calculated the	
14	A. I don't recall.	14	negative goodwill number of 3 billion that is in	
15 16	Q. And I take it it follows, then, that	15 16	Exhibit 378?	
17	you don't recall whether or not you corrected them that the Asset Purchase Agreement provided	17	MR. HUME: Objection. Lacks foundation.	
18		18	A. Would have been Patrick Clackson or	
19		19	someone on his team.	
20	Q. Who would have prepared, if you know,	20	CO-MODIA OIL MID COMMI	
21	the deck itself?	21		
22	A. The deck most likely would have been	22	REDACTED	
23	prepared by Group Planning.	23	N W M N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N	
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PAGES 130-153 REDACTED

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	Page 156		Page 157
1	3-	7	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL - R. RICCI
1 2		1 2	much as I could get to protect the firm.
3	gagi, jehr varu na Jahrindak sana sana.	3	Q. Okay.
4	REDACTED	4	A. And I wasn't sure what Lehman had
5	A THE SEC. SE AND A SEC. SEC.	5	left.
6		6	Q. Okay.
7		7	A. Didn't know there was anything left.
8	0. T. 1	8	Q. All right. What did you do to try to
9	On Friday morning, you took a view	9	determine how much Lehman left that could be
10 11	that you didn't have sufficient cushion, correct?	10 11	transferred to Barclays?  A. I believe I instructed Mr. Klein to
12	A. Uh-huh. Yes.	12	see if Lehman had any other assets.
13	Q. And I think it follows that you	13	Q. Did you tell anybody on Friday morning
14	necessarily had to take a view as to how much	14	that if Barclays were unable to come up with
15	cushion would have been sufficient, am I	15	additional assets, that it would not go through
16	correct?	16	with the transaction?
17	A. Is that a question?	17	A. I don't I recall certainly having
18	Q. Yes. Am I correct?	18	those thoughts. I can't recall if I said that
19 bo	A. Again, there was incredible	19 20	to anyone specifically.  Q. And by "additional assets," I meant
20 21	uncertainty. I was now looking at a transaction which had been signed on Tuesday, which didn't	21	additional Lehman assets, you understood?
22 22	look like a lot of those assets were going to	22	A. Additional Lehman assets, yes.
23	arrive. We had problems getting collateral for	23	2. 12442102101 201111011 400000, 100.
24	the \$45 billion we had outlaid to the Fed.	24	REDACTED
r .		25	

Page 158  1 REDACTED  1 REDACTED  2 Know, we'll take it, we'll take the we won't kill the deal over lookin assets. 5 suggest that Barclays was being piggish? 6 A. I remember having a conversation with 7 Alex Kirk after we had tried to seek more assets, and I expressed some discomfort to Alex 9 that I still didn't think we had enough assets, and he said there's nothing left. And I said something like to him, well, fine, we're not going to be we're not going to be pigs and go  1 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAI know, we'll take it, we'll take the we won't kill the deal over lookin assets.  Q. So, based on that conversa Mr. Kirk, Barclays stopped lookin additional Lehman assets, correct A. I believe that's correct.	chance, but g for more ation with
2 know, we'll take it, we'll take the we won't kill the deal over lookin assets.  5 suggest that Barclays was being piggish?  6 A. I remember having a conversation with Alex Kirk after we had tried to seek more assets, and I expressed some discomfort to Alex that I still didn't think we had enough assets, and he said there's nothing left. And I said and he said there's nothing left. And I said something like to him, well, fine, we're not going to be pigs and go	chance, but g for more ation with
3 we won't kill the deal over lookin 4 Q. At any point did anybody at Lehman 5 suggest that Barclays was being piggish? 6 A. I remember having a conversation with 7 Alex Kirk after we had tried to seek more 8 assets, and I expressed some discomfort to Alex 9 that I still didn't think we had enough assets, 10 and he said there's nothing left. And I said 11 something like to him, well, fine, we're not 12 going to be we're not going to be pigs and go  3 we won't kill the deal over lookin assets.  Q. So, based on that conversa Mr. Kirk, Barclays stopped lookin additional Lehman assets, correct A. I believe that's correct.  9 10 11 12	g for more
Q. At any point did anybody at Lehman suggest that Barclays was being piggish? A. I remember having a conversation with Alex Kirk after we had tried to seek more assets, and I expressed some discomfort to Alex that I still didn't think we had enough assets, and he said there's nothing left. And I said something like to him, well, fine, we're not going to be we're not going to be pigs and go  assets. Q. So, based on that conversa additional Lehman assets, correct A. I believe that's correct.	ntion with
5 suggest that Barclays was being piggish? 6 A. I remember having a conversation with 7 Alex Kirk after we had tried to seek more 8 assets, and I expressed some discomfort to Alex 9 that I still didn't think we had enough assets, 10 and he said there's nothing left. And I said 11 something like to him, well, fine, we're not 12 going to be we're not going to be pigs and go  5 Q. So, based on that conversation with 6 Mr. Kirk, Barclays stopped lookin additional Lehman assets, correct 8 A. I believe that's correct. 9 10 and he said there's nothing left. And I said 11 something like to him, well, fine, we're not 12 going to be we're not going to be pigs and go	
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Alex Kirk after we had tried to seek more assets, and I expressed some discomfort to Alex that I still didn't think we had enough assets, and he said there's nothing left. And I said assets, and I expressed some discomfort to Alex and he said there's nothing left. And I said assets, and I expressed some discomfort to Alex and he said there's nothing left. And I said assets, and I expressed some discomfort to Alex and I believe that's correct.  additional Lehman assets, correct and I believe that's correct.	19 1616
assets, and I expressed some discomfort to Alex that I still didn't think we had enough assets, and he said there's nothing left. And I said something like to him, well, fine, we're not going to be we're not going to be pigs and go  A. I believe that's correct.	
9 that I still didn't think we had enough assets, 10 and he said there's nothing left. And I said 11 something like to him, well, fine, we're not 12 going to be we're not going to be pigs and go 12	•
and he said there's nothing left. And I said  something like to him, well, fine, we're not going to be we're not going to be pigs and go  2  10  11  2  3  4  4  5  4  10  11  12	
something like to him, well, fine, we're not going to be we're not going to be pigs and go 12	
going to be we're not going to be pigs and go 2	
after every last nickel. We'll try to get 13	
14 comfortable with what you have given us, and if 14	
that's the case, we're done.	
16 Q. So is it fair to say that Barclays 16 <b>REDACTED</b>	
17 stopped looking for additional Lehman assets 17	
when Mr. Kirk said there was nothing else left \$\\$\\$	
19 to transfer to Barclays?	
A. I recall saying to Alex that he was 20	
very worried that we were going to walk because 21	
we had asked for more assets, they had given us 22	
what we could, he was worried we were going to 23	
24 walk, and I said, okay, if this is it, if this	
25 is all we can find before we go to court, you 25	
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	Page 164		Page 165
1		1	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL - R. RICCI
2		2	Q. In addition to that 1.9, do you recall
3		3	the amount of any additional assets that were
4		4	transferred to Barclays that day apart from the
5		5	repo?
6	REDACTED	6	MR. HUME: Objection. Vague and
7	WPAW/IPA	7	ambiguous.
8		8	A. That were transferred to Barclays that
9		9	day?
10		10	Q. On Friday morning early throughout the
11		11	day, Barclays was looking for additional assets,
12		12	correct?
13		13	A. Correct.
14		14	Q. And 1.9 was transferred to Barclays,
15	0 01 0 1: 7:	15	correct?
16	Q. Okay. Some point on Friday you had a	16	A. Wasn't transferred. It was agreed
17	conversation with Mr. McDade in which it was	17	that we would take it. Still waiting for it.
18		18	Q. All right. Okay. Was there any
19	J 1	19	additional assets that day other than the 1.9
20	,	20	A. Yes.
21	•	21	Q that was agreed would be
22		22	transferred to Lehman to Barclays?
23		23	A. The 15c3 deposit money.
	A T 1 - 1' 41 - 4 T - 41	D A	Q. And how much was that?
24 25	<b>.</b>	24 25	A. Roughly \$750 million.

PAGES 166-169 REDACTED

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24 25		24	
25	7.5	25	2 172
	Page 172		Page 173
1 2		1 2	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL - R. RICCI this e-mail?
3		3	A. Yes.
4		4	Q. Okay. Had you asked Mr. King to value
5		5	the assets that had been transferred to Barclays
6	REDACTED	6	in exchange for the \$45 billion that it had laid out on the repo?
8	४० के कार कर के प्रस्ता है। सबसे समार स	8	A. He would have been on the team, yes.
9		9	Q. And this number of 48.5 and 49 billion
10 11		10 11	doesn't include the 1.9 of the 15c3 or the \$750,000 I'm sorry, the 1.9 or the \$750,000
12		12	from the 15c3, does it?
13		13	MR. HUME: Objection. Lacks
14		14 15	foundation.
15 16	Q. Mr. Ricci, I show you what has been	16	A. No, it wouldn't. Q. Okay.
17	marked as Exhibit 383, which is an e-mail from	17	A. If I recall correctly, the \$49 billion
1.8	Mr. King to you. Just take a moment to read	18	was roughly I believe what the Fed had pledged
19	this one.	19 20	as collateral against the 45 billion. So Q. Okay. I stated this awkwardly, but I
20 21	Finished? A. Uh-huh.	20 21	just want to be clear. The moneys transferred
22	Q. Mr. King has said the best estimate	22	pursuant to the 15c3 accounts of 750 and the 1.9
23	"current best estimate is the portfolio inc," I	23	is not included in these numbers in Exhibit 383,
24	suppose that means includes, but "7 billion cash	24	is it?
25	is 48.5 to 49 billion." Do you remember getting	25	A. To the best of my knowledge.

PAGES 174-289 REDACTED

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Page 2	92		Page 293
1 REDACTED		1	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL - R. RICCI
		2	CERTIFICATE
3	***************************************	3	STATE OF NEW YORK )
4 5 (Time Noted: 5:34 P.M.)	***************************************		: SS
5 (Time Noted: 5:34 P.M.) 6 oOo	AL AND THE STATE OF THE STATE O	4	COUNTY OF NEW YORK)
7	havan	5	I, Kathy S. Klepfer, a Registered
8		6	Merit Reporter and Notary Public within and
9		7	for the State of New York, do hereby
10		8	certify:
11	h	9	That RICH RICCI, the witness whose
12	L	.0 .1	deposition is herein before set forth, was
13 14	a l	.2	duly sworn by me and that such deposition is a true record of the testimony given by such
15		.2	witness.
16		. 4	I further certify that I am not
17		. 5	related to any of the parties to this action
		.6	by blood or marriage and that I am in no way
RICH RICCI	3	.7	interested in the outcome of this matter.
19	L	. 8	I further certify that neither the
Subscribed and sworn to before me this day		. 9	deponent nor a party requested a review of
of 2009.		0.2	the transcript pursuant to Federal Rule of
22		21	Civil Procedure 30(e) before the deposition
		22	was completed.
23		23	In witness whereof, I have hereunto
24		24	set my hand this 8th day of September, 2009.
25	2	25	

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6	Mr. Hume 282	6	Exhibit 387, Debtors' Third Rule 30(b)(6) 207
7		7	Deposition Notice to Barclays on Issues
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9	Exhibit 378, a document bearing Bates 84	9	and Exchange Deposits
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2	NAME OF CASE. In re Lehman Brothers		
4	DATE OF DEPOSITION: September 8, 2009 NAME OF WITNESS. Rich Ricci		
5 6	Reason Codes: 1. To clarify the record.		
U	2. To conform to the facts.		
7 8	3. To correct transcription errors Page Line Reason		
	From to		
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